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John  V. Orth† 
O MODERN AMERICANS “legal fiction” brings to mind the 
novels of John Grisham or Scott Turow, but to an earlier 
generation of lawyers the phrase meant a different kind 
of make-believe. Essentially, legal fiction (in the old 
sense) meant an irrebuttable allegation of a fact without regard to its 
truth or falsity. The object could be to secure access to a form of 
procedure that was speedier, cheaper, or simply more likely to pro-
duce the desired result. The old action of trover, to recover the 
value of personal property wrongfully withheld, began with an alle-
gation that the property at issue had been lost by the plaintiff and 
found (trouvé in Law French) by the defendant who converted it to 
his own use.1 Of course, it was really immaterial how the defendant 
came to possess the item in question; it could have been purchased, 
or received as a gift, or actually found. The dispute concerned 
                                                                                                    
† John V. Orth is the William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. This article is the eighth in his series of reappraisals in the law of 
property. 
1 3 William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 151-52 (1768) 




whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover its value from the de-
fendant. And the action of trover was the simplest way to get a legal 
resolution of that dispute. 
Likewise, disputes concerning title to real property could be de-
termined by the ancient and cumbersome procedure initiated by the 
writ of right, but the right to present possession – what really mat-
tered – could be tried much more expeditiously by the action of 
ejectment. The problem was that ejectment had been designed to 
resolve questions of a tenant’s right to possession, not an owner’s. 
So, a plaintiff involved in a dispute over title to Blackacre alleged 
that he had leased the land to a tenant, John Doe, who was ejected 
by someone claiming authority from the defendant. The caption of 
the case read “Doe on the Demise [lease] of Plaintiff v. Defendant,” 
usually shortened to “Doe on the Dem. Of …,” or even 
“Doe d … .” Before the defendant’s answer could be heard, he had 
to admit the lease and ejectment, which everyone knew was pure 
fiction; then the court could proceed to the real issue, whether 
Plaintiff or Defendant had the better title.2 These usages were car-
ried over to the British colonies in North America and continued in 
the newly independent country. In a few states such as New Jersey 
and North Carolina the name of the fictitious tenant mutated to 
Den, so the caption became “Den on the Dem. Of … .”3 It became 
settled doctrine in America, that “trover is to personalty what 
ejectment is to realty.”4 
Fictions made available some convenient forms of action; they 
also unlocked the doors to the common law courts. For six hundred 
years, the common law was administered by three courts: Common 
Pleas, King’s Bench, and the Exchequer. Originally their jurisdic-
tion was distinct. In general terms, Common Pleas handled – as its 
                                                                                                    
2 3 BL. COM. 199-206. 
3 See, e.g., Den on the Dem. of Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5 (1787), a landmark case 
on judicial review, briefly discussed in John V. Orth, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 7, 67-68 (1993). 
4 Russell v. Hill, 34 S.E. 640, 640 (N.C. 1899). For a discussion of this case, see 
John V. Orth, Russell v. Hill (N.C. 1899): Misunderstood Lessons, 73 N.C. L. 
REV. 2031-61 (1995). 
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name implied – ordinary disputes; King’s Bench, more serious con-
troversies; and the Exchequer, disputes concerning the royal reve-
nue. Over time, the various courts enlarged their jurisdiction by 
allowing fictitious allegations. Although medieval lawsuits usually 
commenced with an initial filing called a writ, it had early been es-
tablished that proceedings could be commenced by a bill if the de-
fendant was already within the court’s jurisdiction, and King’s 
Bench had jurisdiction over all disputes of whatever kind arising in 
the County of Middlesex, which encompassed Westminster where 
the court sat. All that was required to gain access to King’s Bench, 
then, was to file a bill, known as a “Bill of Middlesex,” alleging a 
trespass in Middlesex by the defendant, who was lurking (latitat) in 
another county, and the court had jurisdiction to hear any real cause 
of action against him. In time, the Bill and its fictitious allegations 
came to be dispensed with altogether. 
Common Pleas responded to this threat to its jurisdiction by al-
lowing a fictional allegation that a defendant who had been sum-
moned had failed to appear and required capture (testatum capias) 
before going on to the real cause in controversy. Not to be left out, 
the Exchequer expanded its reach by allowing an allegation that the 
defendant had failed to do justice to the plaintiff by which he was 
rendered less able (quo minus) to pay his dues to the King, again al-
lowing access to the court for the resolution of the real dispute.5 By 
the mid-eighteenth century it was possible for Sir William Black-
stone to summarize the situation by saying that the first process in 
the three courts was a latitat in King’s Bench, a testatum capias in 
Common Pleas, and a quo minus in the Exchequer.6 
                                                                                                    
5 The judges’ uncharacteristic eagerness to enlarge their jurisdiction – and thereby 
increase their workload – is explained by the fact that the judges and their officers 
were compensated largely out of the fees collected from litigants. For a facetious 
summary with a serious intent, see John V. Orth, A Reverie on Medieval Judges, 
Milton Friedman, and the Supreme Court’s Workload, 69 A.B.A.J. 1454 (1983). 
6 3 BL. COM. 286. 
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In after years, the most notorious example of the use of fiction 
to extend jurisdiction was probably Mostyn v. Fabrigas (1774),7 in 
which the Mediterranean island of Minorca was alleged to be lo-
cated in central London so that a dispute that arose there could be 
resolved in the Court of King’s Bench. Of course, no one was 
fooled by this geographical tomfoolery or by any of the other legal 
fictions. Lord Mansfield, who participated in the decision of Mostyn, 
had observed in another case a few years earlier that “fictions of law 
hold only in respect of the ends and purposes for which they were 
invented; when they are urged to an intent and purpose not within 
the reason and policy of the fiction, the other party may shew the 
truth.”8 Nonetheless, legal fiction carried to such an extent attracted 
increasing criticism in the Age of Enlightenment, and drew the par-
ticular ire of that tireless critic of the common law, Jeremy Ben-
tham.9 Not only did Bentham object to the obscurantism – a charge 
that is hard to deny – but he was outraged by the idea of “a willful 
falsehood having for its object the stealing of legislative power by 
and for hands which could not, or durst not, openly claim it.”10 
Stripped of the fictions, what was going on – as Bentham rightly saw 
– was law making, not by the legislature, but by the courts. 
Not only could convenient fictions overcome jurisdictional ob-
stacles, they could also assist the court in doing justice in individual 
cases. To create an express easement, a deed was required, but 
when one person made long-continued use of the land of another in 
a manner that would normally indicate an easement, the absence of 
a deed could be excused by alleging that it had been lost. If the 
landowner had acquiesced in the use for long enough (usually the 
                                                                                                    
7 1 Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1774). See J.C. Gray, THE NATURE AND 
SOURCES OF THE LAW 35 (2d ed. by Roland Gray, 1927) (1st ed. 1909) (describing 
Mostyn as “the most grotesque of these fictions”); Charles Allan Wright & Mary Kay 
Kane, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 42, n. 2, p. 258 (6th ed. 2002). 
8 Morris v. Pugh, 2 Burr. 1241, 1243, 97 Eng. Rep. 811, 811 (K.B. 1761). 
9 For a brief biographical sketch see John V. Orth, Jeremy Bentham: The Common 
Law’s Severest Critic, 68 A.B.A.J. 710-15 (1982). 




period set by the statute of limitations for the acquisition of an es-
tate in fee simple by adverse possession), the allegation of the “lost 
grant” became irrebuttable – the origin of the modern law of ease-
ments acquired by prescription (literally, “previously written”).11 
A similar technical problem in the law of easements arose if a 
grantor attempted simultaneously to grant a fee simple and retain an 
easement in the granted land. Because at common law no one could 
have an easement in his own land – “so long as there is unity of own-
ership, there can be no easement”12 – to effectuate intention, the 
court had to pretend that the grant of the fee by the grantor to the 
grantee included a simultaneous grant of the easement by the 
grantee to the grantor, leading to the baffling distinction in the law 
of conveyancing between an exception, which excepts (that is, ex-
cludes) an interest from a grant, and a reservation, which reserves 
(that is, in this sense, creates) an entirely new interest.13 
                                                                                                    
11 See Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., THE LAW OF EASMENTS & LICENSES IN 
LAND § 5:1 (2001). See also Jerome J. Curtis, Reviving the Lost Grant, 23 REAL 
PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 535 (1988); Mark A. Clawson, Note, Prescription Adrift 
in a Sea of Servitudes: Postmodernism and the Lost Grant, 43 DUKE L.J. 845 
(1994). Pace Lord Mansfield, the ghost of the lost grant continued to haunt the law 
of easements by prescription since “adverse” use by the claimant was inconsistent 
with “acquiescence” in the use by the landowner. 
12 2 George Thompson, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 
§ 352, p. 305 (1980). 
13 “A reservation is a clause in a deed, whereby the grantor reserves some new thing to 
himself issuing out of the thing granted, and not in esse before; but an exception is 
always of a part of the thing granted, or out of the general words and description in 
the grant.” 4 James Kent, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 468 (12th ed. by 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, 1873) (hereinafter KENT’S COM.). The legal imagina-
tion was apparently exhausted by the effort of imagining the grant of an easement 
from the grantee to the grantor. It could not imagine a reservation in favor of a 
third party, one not in privity with the grantor and grantee. According to a rule at 
least as old as Lord Coke, “the reservation must be to the grantors, or some, or 
one of them, and not to any stranger to the deed.” 2 BL. COM. 299 (1766). See 
Edward Coke, COMMENTARY UPON LYTTLETON § 58, p. 47a (1628). The RE-
STATEMENT (3D) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.6 (2) (2000) rejects the old rule: “The 
benefit of a servitude may be granted to a person who is not a party to the transac-




eparation of powers is one of the cardinal principles of American 
constitutionalism, implicit in the structure of the Federal Consti-
tution and explicit in many state constitutions. The North Carolina 
Constitution of 1776, for example, echoing the Maryland Constitu-
tion of earlier the same year, declared “that the legislative, execu-
tive, and supreme judicial powers of government ought to be for-
ever separate and distinct from each other.”14 But the verbal tri-
umph of separation of powers in America did not mean the end of 
lawmaking by legal fiction. As we have seen, the old common law 
causes of action, such as trover and ejectment, continued in use in 
the New World. So too did the fiction of the lost grant (easement 
by prescription) and the strained concept of easement by reserva-
tion. 
While the precise jurisdictional gambits of the old common law 
courts found no home in the newly organized American court sys-
tem, a remarkable new fiction quickly developed in the federal 
courts to confer jurisdiction where it would otherwise have been 
lacking. By presuming that all the stockholders in a corporation are 
citizens of its state of incorporation, federal courts were able to as-
sume jurisdiction over many suits involving the rapidly proliferating 
new form of business association on the ground of diversity of citizen-
ship. Harvard Law Professor John Chipman Gray early in the twenti-
eth century denounced this fiction as “remarkable for the late date of 
its origin and for its absurd results.”15 
Bentham and his followers had so blackened the name of legal fic-
tion that the name had to go. But a very similar reality remained un-
                                                                                                    
14 N.C. Const. of 1776, Dec’l of Rights § 4, carried forward substantially un-
changed in N.C. Const. art. I, § 6. See Orth, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CON-
STITUTION 41-44. For a modern case involving this provision, see John V. Orth, 
“Forever Separate and Distinct”: Separation of Powers in North Carolina, 62 
N.C. L. REV. 1 (1983). See also Md. Const. of 1776, Dec’l of Rights § 6. To the 
same effect, see Va. Const. of 1776, Bill of Rights § 5; Mass. Const. of 1780, 
Dec’l of Rights § XXX. 




der the label of “constructive this-and-that.” The common law had a 
sorry history of expanding the reach of the medieval Treason Act16 
by the doctrine of “constructive treasons,” which Chief Justice John 
Marshall firmly excluded from federal law in the treason trial of 
Aaron Burr.17 And Lord Mansfield denounced an expansive doctrine 
of constructive revocations in the law of wills: “some over-strained 
resolutions of that sort had brought a scandal upon the law.”18 
Nonetheless, Chancellor Kent reluctantly admitted that this doc-
trine had crossed the Atlantic and flourished in America.19 
Still, legal construction (if not legal fiction) served useful pur-
poses. The law concerning gifts of personal property had long ago 
settled into a rigid pattern: actual delivery of the donated item was 
required, and delivery meant the complete surrender of dominion 
and control.20 But attempted gifts of items that were remote or too 
large to deliver could be upheld on a theory of constructive deliv-
ery, if something that gave access to the thing, such as a key, or if 
some symbol of it, such as a writing, was actually delivered.21 The 
law of landlord and tenant gave the tenant the option of rescinding 
the lease in case of eviction, and eviction meant ouster by the land-
lord. But actions short of actual ouster that made continued occu-
pancy very undesirable, and in some cases similar actions by persons 
                                                                                                    
16 25 Edw. 3, st. 5, c. 2 (1350). 
17 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 59-80 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693) 
(distinguishing Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 126 (1807)). 
18 Swift d. Neale v. Roberts, 3 Burr. 1488, 1491, 97 Eng. Rep. 941, 942-43 (K.B. 
1764). Beginning with the reasonable principle that subsequent marriage and the 
birth of issue impliedly revoked a prior will, the courts had come to find that 
almost any change in circumstances caused a constructive revocation. 
19 4 KENT’S COM. 530. 
20 Modern U.S. Treasury Regulations concerning the effectiveness of gifts for tax 
purposes restate the common law requirement of complete surrender of domin-
ion and control. Reg. § 25-2511-2(b).  
21 Some commentators distinguish symbolic from constructive delivery, see, e.g., 
Dukeminier et al., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 503-04 (7th ed. 2005), but 
symbolic delivery is really only a subset of constructive delivery. Constructive 




other than the landlord, came to be accepted by courts as giving rise 
to the same remedy on a theory of constructive eviction.22 At com-
mon law, fraud required the intentional misrepresentation of a ma-
terial fact, but constructive fraud could be found on a representa-
tion of a fact as of one’s own knowledge when such knowledge was 
actually lacking.23 
Constructive delivery, constructive eviction, and constructive 
fraud were all recognized by common law courts to lessen the rig-
ors of common law rules and produce a just result, but a construc-
tive something can also be produced by statute. The operation of 
the recording acts means that a purchaser is charged with notice of 
whatever is revealed on the face of the record even if he did not 
cause the record to be examined; he has constructive notice.24 And 
apart from the statute, a court can find constructive notice from 
facts on the ground that would cause a reasonable person to make 
inquiries, sometimes called “inquiry notice.”25 In consequence, the 
defense of bona fide purchase – that a good faith purchaser takes 
clear of defects in title unknown to him – is sometimes denied even 
to one who had no actual knowledge. 
Although construction can be a (more or less intended) by-
product of a statute, as with the recording act, it is more commonly 
used by courts to prevent a statute from producing an inequitable 
result. The statute of descent and distribution might provide that on 
the death of a married man survived by a wife and no descendants, 
the wife is to succeed to all his property. But what if she had mur-
dered her husband? One response has been to allow the legal title to 
descend to the murderer as provided by the statute and then, in an 
appropriate proceeding, to impress a constructive trust on the 
                                                                                                    
22 See, e.g., Blackett v. Olanoff, 358 N.E.2d 817 (Mass. 1977) (finding constructive 
eviction due to a disturbance created by other tenants of the same landlord). 
23 See, e.g., Nat’l Academy of Science v. Cambridge Trust Co., 346 N.E.2d 879 
(Mass. 1976). 
24 Gray, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 36-37. 
25 See, e.g., Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925). 
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property.26 In other words, the murderer is treated as a trustee, 
holding bare legal title for the benefit of others. The trust is, of 
course, pure fiction, imposed to prevent wrongful gain from bad 
behavior, a trust ex malificio.27 There was no intention to create it, 
and the trustee is not given the usual powers of control and man-
agement. In fact, the trustee may do nothing with the property ex-
cept whatever is necessary to transfer legal title to the beneficial 
owner.28 Despite its name, the constructive trust is merely a reme-
dial device, not properly part of trust law at all29 – to the consterna-
tion of modern law students, not so inured to legal fictions as their 
predecessors. Of course, legislation in the form of so-called slayer 
statutes can reach the same destination more directly.30 
In addition to the historic common law courts, there was also a 
court of chancery or equity, with jurisdiction generally supplemen-
tal to that of the law courts. This opened the possibility of further 
fictions under the name of “equitable this-and-that,” a possibility 
made even more likely when law and equity came to be adminis-
tered by the same court. Where a child is raised by persons other 
than her parents who did not follow the statutory procedures for 
legal adoption, it might be equitable (in the general sense of “fair”) 
to treat the child as if she had been legally adopted; thus was born 
the concept of equitable adoption.31  
Equity courts had jurisdiction over disputes concerning transfers 
of property because the remedy at law (damages) was presumed to 
                                                                                                    
26 In re Estate of Mahoney, 220 A.2d 475 (Vt. 1966). 
27 See James Barr Ames, Can a Murderer Acquire Title by His Crime and Keep It?, 
in LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 310 (1913) 
(originally published in American Law Register, 1897) (developing theory that 
legal title passes to a murderer subject to a trust ex malificio). 
28 George T. Bogert, TRUSTS § 77, p. 287 (6th ed. 1987) (constructive trustee’s 
“sole duty is to transfer title and possession to the beneficiary”). 
29 See Benjamin N. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 42 (1921). 
30 See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-1ff. See also Uniform Probate Code § 2-803 
(1990). 
31 See, e.g., Lankford v. Wright, 489 S.E.2d 604 (N.C. 1997), noted in 76 N.C. L. 
REV. 2446 (1998). 
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be inadequate, since any given parcel of land is unique. Equitable 
conversion, so-called, confers equitable title on a purchaser from 
the moment an enforceable contract for the sale of land is executed. 
In other words, the purchaser under a still executory contract is 
treated in equity as if the transaction had actually closed because the 
contract was specifically enforceable.32 Not only can equitable con-
version allow a contract to be treated as a grant, it can also allow 
personal property to be treated as real property. When condemna-
tion replaces land with money, the money is held by the same title 
as the realty, which can have significant consequences when the land 
was held in tenancy by the entirety. Just as the land could not have 
been sold or otherwise dealt with by one spouse alone, so the 
money is held in solido, inseverable by the act of either spouse and 
with an indefeasible right of survivorship. 
Mortgage law, too, is marked by the equity court’s special role 
in real estate transactions. Although originally structured as a defea-
sible transfer – in many states it still bears the marks of its origin – 
the mortgage has been hedged about over the years with an elabo-
rate series of protections for the borrowing landowner. But a dis-
tressed borrower might succumb to a lender’s demand that he 
waive these protections, or that he allow the transaction’s true na-
ture to be disguised as an outright sale. Equity will pierce the veil 
and look through to the reality – doing justice by means of a fiction, 
the equitable mortgage. 
 
egal fiction began as a means to add flexibility to the law in an 
age when statutes were few and far between.33 Grown accus-
                                                                                                    
32 Cardozo, JUDICIAL PROCESS 38-39. 
33 See Henry Sumner Maine, ANCIENT LAW 15 (1861) (“A general proposition of 
some value may be advanced with respect to the agencies by which Law is 
brought into harmony with society. These instrumentalities seem to me to be 
three in number, Legal Fictions, Equity, and Legislation. Their historical order is 
that in which I have placed them. Sometimes two of them will be seen operating 




tomed to the practice, the judges continued to use it to address the 
problems inevitably generated by the clash between the operations 
of a rule-based system and the demands of individual justice. A rule 
is settled, whether by precedent or statute, that comes to seem un-
duly restrictive. A gift is intended, but the item to be given is not 
(or cannot be) actually delivered. A tenant leaves premises that have 
been made functionally, if not actually, untenable by the landlord. A 
person in a position to know misstates a fact on which another rea-
sonably relies. A person who acts as a parent fails to comply with 
the terms of the adoption statute. A person with the opportunity to 
inform himself from the record fails to examine it and claims the 
protections accorded a good faith purchaser without notice. An heir 
takes title to property that rightfully should pass to another. A per-
son obligated to purchase real property has not yet actually been 
tendered the deed. A borrower has tried to surrender legal protec-
tions incident to a mortgage. 
Legal development by precedent is of no help in these cases. The 
law has already reached its outermost limit. There was really no 
delivery, eviction, fraud, or notice. The child was not legally 
adopted. Legal title has not yet passed; no mortgage was actually 
given. It is no longer possible to say that these cases are like the oth-
ers in all essential details, the necessary predicate for the application 
of precedent or a statute. But justice demands a similar result. So, 
fictions in the form of legal or equitable constructions are pressed 
into service. If the cases are not really alike, then a court will simply 
pretend that they are. 
Of course, legal fiction is not the only device to handle the clash 
between inflexible rules and just results. The ancient law of waste 
prohibits a person with only a limited interest in real property such 
as a life estate from altering the physical condition of the land. But 
what if the change is beneficial and restoring the property would 
actually be destructive of value? To escape the consequences of 
waste by indulging the fiction that there had been no alteration at all 
goes too far, so the effect of the rule must be nullified by a different 
device. Waste it is and waste it remains, but a new form of waste is 
recognized: meliorating waste, waste that does not waste (that is, 
John V. Orth 
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diminish) the property, but actually improves it, and so does not 
merit the consequences of real waste.34 Thus, the rule is preserved 
and justice is done.  
Sometimes, the root of the problem is a statutory requirement 
of form, as with the law prescribing the form of adoption. The Stat-
ute of Frauds requires a writing “signed by the party to be charged 
therewith” for “any contract or sale of lands, tenements or heredi-
taments, or any interest in or concerning them.”35 What is to be 
done in the case of a deed poll, signed only by the grantor and ac-
cepted by the grantee, but including covenants to be performed by 
the grantee? How is the grantee who never signed to be held liable 
for any violations of the covenants? It has been seriously suggested 
that perhaps the grantee can be held to have adopted the grantor’s 
signature as the grantee’s own.36 Of course, the straightforward 
approach is simply to dispense with the statutory requirement of a 
signature in this case.37 
What about ill-advised or unadvised parties who enter into an 
oral contract for the sale of land? The equitable doctrine of part per-
formance allows the court to enforce the contract despite the Stat-
ute of Frauds if actions such as a change in possession, payment, and 
the making of improvements have taken place.38 The chancellor’s 
conscience is salved by the reasoning that these objective acts are 
referable only to both parties’ understanding that a binding contract 
                                                                                                    
34 See, e.g., Melms v. Pabst Brewing, 79 N.W. 738 (Wis. 1899). 
35 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 4 (1677). 
36 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 408 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) (“[A]cceptance by 
the grantee … amounts to an adoption of the signature of the grantor as that of the 
grantee also, so that the requirement of the statutes of frauds as to signature is con-
sidered satisfied.”). 
37 See, e.g., Harris & Gurganus v. Williams, 246 S.E.2d 791, 794 (N.C. App. 1978) 
(“A grantee, by acceptance of a deed, becomes bound by conditions, etc., contained 
therein, even though he has not signed the deed. The delivery and acceptance of a 
deed takes covenants contained therein out of the operation of the statute of 
frauds.”). Accord RESTATEMENT (3D) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.7 cmt. g (2000). 
38 See Zechariah Chafee, Jr. & Edward D. Re, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITY 
549-50 (5th ed. 1967). 
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had been made – thereby satisfying the policy behind the statute, 
securing reliable evidence of intention. What if a person makes an 
unqualified conveyance in due form but subject to an oral agree-
ment to reconvey under certain conditions? Technically void, the 
oral agreement can nonetheless be enforced under a theory of con-
structive trust in order to prevent fraud, a further instance of a trust 
ex malificio.39 
Similarly, an oral grant of an easement fails under the statute, 
but entry by the grantee is no trespass because the grant can at least 
function as a license, which is not subject to the requirement of a 
signed writing. If improvements are made by the grantee in reason-
able reliance on the validity of the easement, the licensor can be 
estopped to revoke the license (at least so long as necessary for the 
grantee to recoup on the investment).40 Of course, an irrevocable 
license is indistinguishable from an easement, the only difference 
between an easement and a license being the revocability of the lat-
ter. In consequence, although easements cannot be created orally, 
an oral easement coupled with reasonable reliance can become an 
irrevocable license – or, to make a long story short, an easement 
“by estoppel.”41 
Again, the Statute of Frauds requires a writing for leases of more 
than a certain period.42 What is to be done in case of an innocent 
                                                                                                    
39 See, e.g., Hieble v. Hieble, 316 A.2d 777 (Conn. 1972). 
40 See, e.g., Stoner v. Zucker, 83 P. 808 (Cal. 1906). On the duration of the 
estoppel, compare 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 321 (“The irrevocability … ex-
tends only so far as necessary to protect the licensee in the expenditures made by 
enabling him to realize upon them.”) with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVI-
TUDES, ch. 4, Intro. Note, at p. 496 (“The first Restatement of Property took the 
position that irrevocable licenses … have a shorter duration, based on the period of 
time necessary to amortize the expenditures that gave rise to creation of the ease-
ment. A similar result could be reached in a particular case under § 4.3, but only if 
the circumstances suggest that the parties intended or reasonably expected that 
result. Otherwise, the irrevocable license is treated the same as any other ease-
ment.”). 
41 See Bruce & Ely, LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES § 6:1. 
42 29 Car. 2, c. 3, §§ 1-3 (1677) (leases of more than three years “from the making 
thereof”). Some statutes preserve the three-year period, see, e.g., N.C. Gen. 
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failure to comply? The court can recognize the creation of a periodic 
tenancy instead.43 While not achieving all that the parties intended 
to accomplish (as with part performance), this result at least gives 
both parties legal rights, and the tenant some security of tenure. 
Ironically, periodic tenancies are exempt from the statute because 
the longest period allowed is one year; yet, unless timely notice is 
given by either party, the tenancy may endure for as long as (or 
even longer than) the term of the unenforceable oral lease.44 
The Statute of Wills allows revocation by physical act, if done 
with the requisite intent, the animus revocandi. What if a testator 
who has a validly executed will revokes it and executes another in-
strument which is intended to replace it but which is, for one reason 
or another, defective? In order to effectuate intention a court may 
disregard the revocation and assume that it was meant to be condi-
tional on the validity of the replacement. To avoid the name (if not 
the reality) of legal fiction, the device is known to generations of 
law students as “dependent relative revocation.”45 
Finally, the Statute of Wills prescribes a specific form for the 
execution of a will, usually the signature of the testator witnessed 
by two disinterested witnesses. What to do about innocent failures 
to comply? Strained constructions upholding technically defective 
wills have been resorted to46 – the reverse of the “over-strained 
                                                                                                    
Stat. § 22-2, but most reduce the period to one year. E.g., Va. Code Ann.  
§ 11-2. 
43 William Geldart, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW 84 (D.C.M. Yardley ed., 9th 
ed. 1984) (“[A]t common law a lease which ought to be made by a deed but is not 
will not completely fail of effect, if possession is taken and rent paid under it; the 
tenant will be treated as tenant from year to year upon the terms of the lease so 
far as they are applicable to such a tenancy.”). 
44 Latterly, as leases are increasingly conceptualized as contracts, it has been held 
that part performance may also be applicable in the case of leases. See, e.g., 
Corder v. Idaho Farmway, Inc., 986 P.2d 1019 (Idaho App. 1999). 
45 See Thomas E. Atkinson, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 88, p. 452 (de-
scribing it as the “fiction of conditional revocation”). 
46 See, e.g., In re Snide, 418 N.E.2d 656 (N.Y. 1981) (allowing probate of will not 
signed by testator when error resulted from mistaken execution of mutual wills 
by husband and wife). 
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resolutions” concerning constructive revocations that Lord Mans-
field long ago found so scandalous. Latterly, it has been proposed to 
disregard the formal requirements altogether. The Uniform Probate 
Code, in a section captioned “harmless error,” would allow the pro-
bate of an informally executed will if a judge is convinced by “clear 
and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document 
… to constitute … the decedent’s will … .”47 The vestigial re-
quirement of a “document” may be the next to go, as videotaping 
and computer files become commonplace.48 In other words, here 
we pass beyond the realm of rules – real, fictional, constructive, or 
equitable – and into the realm of discretion, the judge to do justice 
on the facts of each individual case. 
 
e have seemingly wandered far from the ancient legal fic-
tions allowing allegations of facts known to be false. But our 
path has actually brought us close to the heart of the matter. The 
Rule of Law, humanity’s best effort so far to produce justice on a 
regular basis, requires rules, but because of their rigidity and gener-
ality, rules can produce injustice in individual cases. Making and 
changing rules is the very definition of legislation, but the legislature 
is constrained to make rules with only prospective effect, and in any 
event the legislature is not in permanent session and cannot be ex-
pected to address every imaginable (and unimaginable) contingency. 
The judges have responded from time immemorial with fictions and 
constructions of one sort or another. The larger fictions, of course, 
are that the judges are not legislating and that the newly discovered 
rules had been there all along. Perhaps, as critics since the days of 
                                                                                                    
47 Uniform Probate Code § 2-503 (1990, as amended 1997). Although captioned 
“harmless error,” this section really grants a dispensing power. See John V. Orth, 
Intention in the Law of Property: The Law of Unintended Consequences, 8 
GREEN BAG 2D 59, 64-65 (2004). 
48 See Rioux v. Coulombe, 19 Est. & Tr. Rep. 2d 201 (Quebec 1996) (probating 
electronic will under provincial statute allowing substantial compliance with 
Wills Act). See also Nicholas Kasirer, From Written Record to Memory in the 




Bentham have maintained, it is time to abandon these pretenses and 
insist on candor. But it is a fact that so long as there have been rules, 
there have been legal fictions, allowing slightly different cases to be 
shoehorned into existing patterns. And legal fictions will persist – 
until, that is, we are ready to abandon the Rule of Law altogether 
and simply allow the judges to resolve every dispute “on its merits.” 
 
 
 
